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1. INTRODUCTION

testimonial privilege to a narrowly
defined class of claimants.

The Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court has held that the
right to privacy protects "confidential
communications" from a child to his
parents. 1 In so holding, the court
expressed concern over the policy
implications of allowing the state to
"compel parents to disclose information
given to them in context of [a familial]
confidential setting."2 Although the
court based its holding on constitutional
grounds, it effectively adopted a
testimonial privilege 3 unique in this
country's jurisprudence. 4 Whether this
so-called "parent-child privilege" will
gain general acceptance in other
jurisdictions or is merely an aberration
found primarily in the New York courts 5
is not yet clear.6
This article examines the historical
bases and the relevant policy arguments
which underlie testimonial privileges in
general, and those which relate to the
parent-child privilege in particular.
Special attention is devoted to recent
case law on the subject. Lastly, the
author proposes a model statute which
would extend a limited chitd-parent 7

II. TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES IN
GENERAL
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One commentator has recently
classified privileges into "three distinct
types," including those designed to
protect individuals against unlawful
government intrusions (as in the case of
compelled self-incrimination) and those
which "protect the maintenance of our
Government" (as provided by the
protection from unlawful disclosure
which is afforded government secrets). 8
This article, however, is concerned with
the third "type" of privilege; that is,
privileges "designed to be a 'significant
expression of the law's concern or
regard for the security of the individual
as a participant in relationships which the
state considers it important to foster and
protect and ... for the security and
sanctity of the relationship itself. "'9
In recent decades, testimonial
privileges of this latter type have
proliferated in number far beyond those
found at common law. 10 The earliest
common law privileges addressed the
values and concerns of society and law
makers in a somewhat imprecise

manner. Dean Wigmore observed, for
example, that a "gentlemen's honor"
and "one's pledge of privacy" were
reason enough at one time to claim
privilege from giving testimony. 11 Thus,
while the goal of these privileges may
have focused on the interest of the
communicating parties in maintaining
the integrity of the communication to
the extent that it was private, the
privilege was so ill-defined as to be
unworkable. 12
The English courts soon came to
recognize that privileges against
compelled testimony presented
obstacles to the essential truth gathering
function of the court. As a result, the
firm rule was established that "[N]o
pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can
avail against a demand for the truth in a
court of justice." 13 It was reasoned that
society has a "right" to evidence which
enhances the quest for truth, and that
the right to that truth is vindicated by
the imposition of a "duty" upon each
member of society to tell what he
knows. 14 Consequently, the maxim that
"[ t ]he public ... has a right to every
man's evidence"15 prevailed.
Like the privileges found at common
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law, modern testimonial privileges have
devolved more from societal concerns
than from any strictly legal theory. In
contrast to the common law, however, it
is no longer axiomatic that "[ w ]hen the
course of justice requires the
investigation of the truth, no man has
any knowledge that is rightly private." 16
Modern society requires effective
interaction among its members if it is to
function successfully. If one accepts that
effective interaction between
communicants is enhanced by openness
and the absence of fear of unwanted
disclosure,17 certain relationships are
indeed "rightly private." Because society
benefits from certain confidential (and
"rightly private") interaction,
testimonial privileges are employed to
foster particular relationships on the
theory that the benefits to society
outweigh the cost exacted by their
operation.
Current testimonial privileges act to
prevent disclosure of confidential
communications between individuals
within the context of the protected
relationship. Where a valid basis for a
privilege is presented, it falls to the
opponent of the privilege to
demonstrate that the privilege does not
apply.18 But, because they hamper the
"truth-seeking function of legal
proceedings," 19 testimonial privileges
are construed strictly by the courts when
their operation is asserted.2°
It is clearly established that only "the
person vested with the outside interest
or relationship fostered by the particular
privilege" may claim its benefits to the
extent that the privilege acts to preserve
confidences. 21 In the case of
"professional privileges" (i.e., those
privileges other than the husband-wife
privilege)22, the privilege may be
asserted only by its "owner. "23
Circumstances which tend to indicate
that a legitimate expectation of

confidentiality is held by a
communicant otherwise entitled to
claim a privilege, thus entitles him to
assert the claim. 24
With the exceptions of the husbandwife 25 and the attorney-client 26
privileges which appeared at common
law,27 present testimonial privileges
generally are statutory in origin; and,
excepting the husband-wife privilege, all
are designed to encompass the personal
associations entered into by
professionals in the conduct of an
avocation. Although some states
recognize privileges not recognized by
others, many states have extended
recognition to the physician-patient,28
cleric-penitent,29 psychotherapistpatient,30 accountant-client,31 social
worker-client,32 and newsperson 33
privileges.
The generally acknowledged test for
validation of testimonial privileges
consists of four criteria proposed by
Dean Wigmore. 34 He argued that a
communication is entitled to
recognition and affirmative sanction
only when the following are evident:
(1) The communications must
originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) The element of confidentiality
must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties.

(3) The relation must be one which
in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.

( 4) The injury that would inure to
the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal
litigation. 35
Wigmore himself pointed out that

two of the generally recognized
privileges did not meet all four criteria.
He asserted that recognition of the
doctor-patient privilege, in particular,
rests on the fallacious assumption that
the second and fourth conditions are
"generally present. "36
Of greater difficulty to Wigmore was
the husband-wife privilege. The
principal argument against that privilege
is that the fourth condition is not met
insofar as "the occasional compulsory
disclosure in court of even the most
intimate marital communicatons [will]
not in fact affect to any perceptible
degree the extent to which spouses share
confidences."37 Nevertheless, Wigmore
asserted that "since the other three
conditions are so fully satisfied and since
the compulsory disclosure of marital
secrets at least might cast a cloud upon an
essential aspect of the institution of
marriage, the present privilege should be
recognized. "38
If shared confidences are indeed
among the "essential aspect[ s J" of the
marital relationship, and if the
relationship between parents and their
children flows directly from and adheres
to the marital relationship, it is proper to
inquire whether the same "aspects"
appear in the parent-child relationship
itself. If it is determined that they do
appear, there can be little doubt that the
underlying rationale for a testimonial
privilege involving confidential
communications between children and
their parents is established, at least to the
extent that such rationale is in
conformity with Wigmore's "essential
aspect" rationale supra. 39
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III. THE "PARENT .CHILD
PRIVILEGE" AND THE COURTS
A. The New York Cases
As indicated at the beginning of this
article,40 the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York has had
occasion to consider the question of the
so-called 'parent-child privilege.'41 In
Application of A & M the court reached
its landmark decision on the basis of the
constitutional right to privacy42 and on
public policy considerations involving
the desirability of curtailing the
intrusive power of the state. 43 In a
stirring colloquy the court declared:
If we accept the proposition
that the fostering of a
confidential parent-child
relationship is necessary to
the child's development of a
positive system of values,
and results in an ultimate
good to society as a whole,
there can be no doubt what
the effect on that relationship would be if the State
could compel parents to
disclose information given

compel their testimony before a grand
jury regarding the alleged admissions. 46
The subpoena was quashed on motion
by the parents, apparently on two
grounds: (1) that the marital privilege
encompassed a parent-child privilege;47
and, (2) that a constitutional right of
privacy extended to confidential intrafamily communications. 48 On appeal
from the order to quash the subpoena,
the New York Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, reversed the Trial
Term on other grounds 49 but held, inter
alia, that the rights of privacy protected
the confidential communications made
by a minor child to his parents "under
some circumstance. "SO
In A & M the court was not
confronted with the issue of
"ownership" of the privilege asserted. 51
In remanding the case the court confined
its directions to the factual context
involved, applying a balancing test
between the 'legitimate [state] interest in
the process of fact-finding necessary to
discover, try and punish criminal
behavior"52 and the legitimate
expectation of privacy vested in the

Surely the thought of the state forcing
a mother and father to reveal their child's
alleged misdeeds is shocking to our
sense of decency, fairness and propriety.
to them in the context of that
confidential setting. Surely
the thought of the State
forcing a mother and father
to reveal their child's alleged
misdeeds, as confesed to
them in private, to provide
the basis for criminal charges
is shocking to our sense of
decency, fairness and
propriety. It is inconsistent
with the way of life we
cherish and guard so
carefull y and raises the
specter of a regime which
encourages betrayal of one's
offspring.44
In A & M a sixteen-year-old youth
was believed by prosecutors to have
made voluntary admissions to his
parents within the privacy of their home
regarding an arson fire at a nearby
college campus. 45 Acting on reports by
witnesses that the boy was seen in the
area of the fire, a local district attorney
sought to subpoena the boy's parents to
14-The Law Forum/Spring, 1985

youth and his family.53 The court noted
that it may be necessary for a trial court
to conduct additional evidentiary
hearings 54 and it set forth three criteria
which must be met before a
communication from the child to his
parents is entitled to the privilege. 55 The
communication must have been (1)
made by the minor 56 child,57 (2) "in the
context of the familial setting,"58 and,
(3) within the context of an appeal for
"support, advice or guidance ... ."59 If
these criteria were met the court
concluded, "the interest of society in
protecting and nuturing the parent-child
relationship is of such overwhelming'
significance that the State's interest in
fact-finding must give way."60 Thus,
despite an express acknowledgement by
the court that the adoption of new
privileges is an exclusively legislative
function,61 the court in A & M
effectively "created" a new testimonial
privilege. 62
It is unfortunate that the A & M court
did not address the issue of privilege in a

more direct manner. While there can be
little doubt that the court intended that
the foregoing criteria apply beyond the
context of the case before it, the court
failed to adequately define the
parameters of the privilege it had
created. Instead, in a later footnote the
court indicated that its "discussion
encompasse[ d] cases only in which all
family members seek to preserve the
confidentiality of the communications. "63
This vague caveat was surely intended to
narrow, not broaden, the scope of
inquiry; however, if such was the court's
intent, it accomplished the opposite
result by its failure to anticipate and
resolve such issues as whether the
privilege may be maintained when the
communication occurs in the presence
of siblings or other "family members,"
whether those who join in asserting the
privilege are required to be present at the
time the communication is made,64 and,
whether the assertion of the privilege
may be defeated when one of the parents
to whom the confidential communication is made wishes to disclose the
communication in the honest belief that
disclosure is in the best long-term
interest of the child. 65 It would appear,
then, that despite the otherwise
adequate limitations of the three criteria
set forth by the court,66 its failure to
define the scope of its holding
encouraged disparate application of the
holding by other courts.
Diverse application of the A & M
holding was clearly evident when, less
than two years after that decision, a
Westchester County (New York) court
had occasion to consider the issue of the
parent-child privilege in People v.
Fitzgerald. 67 The two cases were similar
in that both involved allegedly
confidential communications from a
child to his parent(s), and involved
communications made for the apparent
purpose of obtaining support, advice
and guidance from the parente s). The
principal factual distinction between the
two cases was the ages of the children
involved.
In Fitzgerald, the father of a twenty
three-year old man sought to suppress
the testimony given by the father before
a grand jury which was investigating the
hit-and-run killing of a teenage gir1.68
The son had discussed the matter with
his father two days after the accident and
the father had subsequently testified
under subpoena before a grand jury as to
the details of the conversation. 69 On a
motion by the defendant's father to
preclude the substance of his testimony
before the grand jury which related to
the conversation with his son, the court

found that "[a 'parent-child' privilege]
can and does exist, grounded in law,
logic, morality and ethics"70 and that the
conversation involved a "confidential
communication" between the defendant
and his father. 7l The court then ruled
that the State was precluded "from
compelling disclosure from the father
on such matters."72
The Fitzgerald court believed it was
confronted with "a classic example for
the application of a parent-child
privilege"73 and held that the privilege
applied regardless of the age of the
child. 74 The court noted the three
criteria set forth by the A & M court, but
rejected the limitations sought by the
State as to age, declaring "[ t ]he mutual
trust and understanding ... between the
parent and the child cannot be made
subject to the intrusion of the State
merely because of a proposed artificial
barrier of age. "75
In rejecting age as a factor for
application of a parent-child privilege,
the Fitzgerald court analogized the
privilege to the husband-wife privilege. 76
The court noted that the husband-wife
privilege is mutual in that "[b ]oth
parties ... must consent to divulgence of
confidential communications between
them. "77 The court reasoned that the
interests which underlie the marital
privilege also adhere to the entire
familial setting insofar as "the family
relationship forms a common bond
wherein the interests of the parties are
similar .... "78 Thus, the court held, inter
alia, where the confidential
communications 79 occur between a
parent and a child within the context of
the familial setting, and are "intended by
both parties for the purpose of obtaining
support, advice and guidance, "80 the
communications themselves are
privileged and their disclosure may not
be compelled when either party asserts
the privilege. 8l
The holdings of the A & M and
Fitzgerald courts are similar as they relate
to the viability of a parent-child
testimonial privilege; however, as
applied, the factual context- of the two
cases and the manner in which the courts
resolved the issues before them renders
the decisions wholly incompatible. A &
M involved an unemancipated minor
child82 who apparently was not under
indictment,83 but was merely a possible
target of a grand jury investigation into a
crime. 84 In Fitzgerald, the communicant
was emancipated, an adult, and was a
defendant in a criminal action. 8s
Further, in A & M the parents of the
child sought to invoke the privilege for
the purpose of avoiding altogether a

subpoena to appear before a grand
jury.86 Fitzgerald involved a motion to
suppress testimony voluntarily given
before a grand jury by the parent of an
adult defendant. 87 Although it was not a
significant issue in either of the two
cases, the communicant in Fitzgerald was
a co-petitioner with his father in
asserting the privilege. 88
Finally, the divergence of the opinions
in these two cases illustrates a principal
rationale for the rejection by the courts
of invitations to create new testimonial
privileges. Arguably, the decision in
Fitzgerald resulted from a combination
of inadequate analysis on the part of the
A & M court89 and erroneous reliance
on the arguments of trial counsel. 90
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that
the "state of the law" in New York is at
best uncertain regarding the question of
whether a de facto parent-child privilege
exists in that State, and under what
circumstances it applies. It is also
arguable that Fitzgerald is, at best,
dubious authority,9l particularly when
considered in isolation. Thus, it appears
that A & M must neccesarily be

... [c ]onfidential communications
between family members have not yet
been afforded the status of testimonial
privilege. "98
The court considered this failure to
recognize a familial privilege as
anomalous in view of its conclusion that
many of the existing privileges "have
common elements
[ w ]hich are
socially desirable" and which are
analogous to the parent-child
relationship.99 By way of illustration the
court compared the attorney-client,
husband-wife and pschotherapist-client
privileges, noting that these privileged
relationships are "socially desirable"
and that they require confidentiality
among communicants. IOO
Refering to the husband-wife
privilege in particular, the court noted
that despite arguments against its
continued operation, "[its] continued
vitality indicates a legislative and judicial
determination that invading the privacy
of the marital relationship is simply too
high a price to pay for the possible
benefits of compelled disclosure. "lOl
The court expressed a similar view of the

A limited child--parent testimonial
privilege is highly desirable and is
legally and morally supportable.
confined to its factual setting while the
question awaits further clarification by
the New York courts.
B. In reo Agosto: A Federal Court View
The parent-child privilege has been
recognized by the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada.92 In a
lengthy opinion the court declared that
"a parent's liberties are inseparable from
those of his children"93 and held that a
child and his father were entitled to
claim the privilege mutually and
independently94 when the child's
testimony was sought for presentation
before a grand jury.9S The court also
adhered to the position taken by the
Fitzgerald court that age could not be a
factor in determining whether to extend
the privilege. 96
Preliminary to its discussion of the
case on the merits the court surveyed the
existing testimonial privileges and how
they related to the parent-child
privilege. 97 The court observed that,
despite the "[recent] expansion of
[testimonial] privilege[ s] protecting
communications between professionals
and lay persons in a wide variety of fields

parent-child privilege insofar as the
privilege "is necessary to protect and
preserve the family harmony and
prevent dissention [within the family
unit],,102 despite its concededly adverse
effect on the truth-gathering function of
the court. Thus, the court's support of
this new family-based privilege rested, at
least in part, on an apparent belief that
the privilege was supportable on the
basis on broad social policy, that society
itself promotes certain relationships as
inherently desirable and valued, and that
the occasional loss of valuable evidence
is an acceptable cost of this expression of
society's will. 103
The court related the broad social
policy issues supra to protections
afforded under the Constitution and
concentrated on the need to protect and
foster "'family autonomy"104 in the face
of occasional competing State
interests. !Os Like the A & M and
Fitzgerald courts before it, the Agosto
court also found support for the
privilege in the Constitutional right of
privacy,106 and noted the words of
Justice Brandeis who declared that '''as
Stning. 1985 !Th" Law Forum-15

against the Government, the right to be
let alone - [is] the most comprehensive
of rights and the most valued by civilized
men. "'107 The court thus concluded that
recent Supreme Court treatment of
privacy issues associated with the family
setting
demonstrate[ s] that the
Supreme Court has determined that
there is a 'private realm of family life
which the State cannot enter."'108
The court concluded that the parentchild testimonial privilege satisfied the
first three of Wigmore's conditions 109
supra for recognition of a privilege, but
that resolution of the fourth condition,
"[ whether] [t ]he injury that would
inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communication [would] be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation," 110
presented a more difficult problem. In
the opinion of the court the difficulty
arose 'because this component requires
a balancing between the benefit to
Ijustice ... as opposed to the injury to the
parent-child relationship." III
The court expressed the view that the
forced disclosure of confidential
communications between a parent and a
child would lead to a "breakdown of the
trust" between them. 112 The court
believed this "breakdown" would cause
"the child [to] view the entire legal
system [with suspicion] ... [and that]
[t]he parents themselves might lose
respect for the legal system, if forced to
testify against the child." 113
According to the court, the legal
system itself would suffer a detrimental
effect if parents were compelled to
testify against their children.
Specifically, the court expressed the
view that such compulsion would lead
to perjured testimony by witnesses who
would attempt to protect one
another. 114 While the court
acknowledged that the witness may, of
course, elect to tell the truth, it opined
that it was highly likely that
circumstances would effectively leave
witnesses only the choice between
commlttmg perjury or subjecting
themselves to possible contempt
proceedings for refusing to testify at
all. liS The court concluded that the
expected benefit to society brought
about by the recognition of the parentchild testimonial privilege outweighed
the benefit to justice because, inter alia,
"the expected benefit to justice ... is
perhaps illusory."116
Finally, the court noted that it was
"free to extend the present law of privileges
to deal with those situations
encountered in which constitutional
protection is deemed essential." 117 The
(t
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court premised the foregoing view not
on the Constitution per se, but on "[t]he
expansive posture taken by
Congress"118 in drafting Federal Rule of
Evidence 501.119 The court observed
that the history of Rule 501 clearly
indicated that Congress intended for the
courts to remain free to recognize new
testimonial privileges. Because Congress
had rejected an Advisory Committee
proposal which narrowed some existing
privileges while completely abrogating
others, the court concluded that "Rule
501 recognized and arguably even
advocated the evolution of new testimonial
privileges as they were deemed necessary
by courts in the future." 120
The Agosto court displayed a
courageous attitude in its treatment of
the issues with which it was confronted.
In acknowledging the reluctance of
other federal courts to adopt the
privilege and the refusal of those courts
to follow the lead of the New York
courts, the Agosto court declared:
"[t]his court will assume no such timid
posture ... [n ]or will [it] ignore wellreasoned legal arguments simply
because they occurred within the
framework of state court opinions."121
Thus, the court followed the reasoning
of the New York cases in general, and of
the Fitzgerald court in particular,
concluding that the confidential
communications between parents and
their children are entitled to privilege
without restrictions as to the age 122 of
the communicant or distinctions based
on the source of the communication. 123
While its enthusiasm for addressing
the question of the parent-child
privilege may be commendable, the
Agosto court exceeded the bounds of
proper judicial review by deciding
questions not in issue. It is a
fundamental principle of judicial review
that courts shall not reach constitutional
questions unless presented squarely
with justiciable issues. 124 Assuming as
correct the court's observation that it
was "free to extend the present law of
privileges"12S pursuant to Federal Rule
of Evidence 501, the court could have
resolved the issue of privilege on the
basis of non-constitutional
authorities. 126 Nor need it have reached
beyond the facts of the case to decide
that age could not be a factor in defining
the privilege.
The court's analysis of the viability of
the parent-child privilege when it is
tested against the Wigmore conditions is
generally sound. In that portion of its
opinion dealing with the Wigmore
analysis, the court relied almost
exclusively on a law review article
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written by Charles Coburn on the
subject of the parent-child testimonial
privilege. 127 However, no where in his
article did Coburn suggest the
desirability of extending the privilege to
include the "right" of parents to use
their children as a shield against the rule
of law.
In traversing well beyond the bounds
of proper review, the Agosto court
inadvertently undermined the strength
of its own authority. In its wellintentioned desire to be at the vanguard
of "a new frontier in the area of
testimonial privileges, "128 the court
discarded the basic tenets of judicial
restraint, and thereby sacrificed at least a
degree of its power to persuade. 129

C. Other Courts

If any of the foregoing court decisions
are to gain support it will most likely be
the A & M decision because of its
relative restraint. In this regard, the
comment of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts is telling. In declining
to adopt the parent-child testimonial
privilege, the court rejected Agosto but
declared that it was the court's "extreme
position - an absolute privilege not to
testify at all - that [it]reject[ed]."130
Other state and federal courts have
declined to follow the lead urged by the
A & M, Fitzgerald and Agosto courts.
While several have implied a degree of
sympathy regarding the concept of a
parent-child privilege, 131 most have
appeared to be either neutral or, in the
case of the Indiana Court of Appeals,
completely hostile to the proposal.132
In United States v. jones, 133 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit rejected the privilege when it was
claimed by the twenty-nine-year-old
emancipated son of a grand jury
"target." The court distinguished A &
M on the grounds that jones involved an
adult child who was emancipated, and
that the information sought related to
business activities, not intra-familial
communications. 134 However, the court
indicated that changed factual
circumstances might yield a different
result in the future.135 The court
concluded with the reservation that "in
particular, we do not endeavor to decide
to what extent the age of the child and
whether or not emancipation has occurred
mayor may not affect the decision as to
whether any familial privilege exists."136
In In re Grand jury Proceedings,137 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declined
to adopt the privilege. There, a grand
jury subpoena had been issued to the
child of adults under investigation in
connection with a homicide. The court
distinguished the New York cases,

noting that those involved confidential
communications from the child to the
parent and that they "were founded for
the most part on the desire to avoid
discouraging a child from confiding in
his parents. "138 Finally, the court
implied that even had the factual settings
been analogous, the "persuasiveness" of
the New York cases was questionable. 139
The Ninth Circuit of Appeals,140 the
Illinois Supreme Court 141 and the
California Court of Appeals l42 have
declined to recognize the parent-child
testimonial privilege, at least in part on
the ground that the appropriate vehicle
for extending recogmtlOn to new
privileges devolves to the legislatures.
Finally, in Hunter v. State 143 the
Indiana Court of Appeals flatly rejected
the claim of two adults convicted of
child abuse of their five-year-old
adopted child. l44 Citing Cissna v.
State,145 decided by the same court the
previous year, the court declared: "[In
Cissna] [t ]his court soundly denounced
the theory of a 'parent-child' privilege ...
and we feel correctly SO."146 Although it
is arguable that the court's strong
language was precipitated by the
outrageous nature of the case before it,
stronger language in rejecting the claim
of a parent-child privilege will not be
found.
D. Summary
Despite the results which obtained in
A & M, Fitzgerald and Agosto, general
acceptance by the courts of a parentchild testimonial privilege seems
unlikely. The reluctance of the courts to
create new testimonial privileges is
based on sound policy rationale
including a longstanding policy of
deferring to the legislative process. The
diverse results of the three principal
cases clearly illustrate the hazards
inherent in judicial law-making of this
type. Yet, despite the policy of restraint,
the opinions cited in Section C supra
indicate that a majority of the courts
which have considered the question are
generally sympathetic to the proposition
of a limited privilege.
_

IV. THE LIMITED CHILDPARENT TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
The decisions cited supra which have
recognized a parent-child privilege l47 in
some form are clearly the exception and
not the rule on the question of whether
confidential communications betwen
children and their parents may be
withheld from the fact finding process at
either the trial, grand jury, or the
discovery levels of the judicial
process. 148 It is also clear that, among the
courts extending the "privilege," there

has been an absence of a consensus as to
whether it applies as a familial privilege
149 generally, or whether its application
should be limited to those
communications from a child to his or
her parents. 150 Finally, there is an
absence of agreement on the question of
whether the issues presented involve a
privilege per se,151 or whether they rise
to the level of a constitutional right of
privacy. 152
Despite these apparent inconsistencies, a limited child-parent testimonial
privilege is highly desirable and is legally
and morally supportable. Because of the
inconsistencies, a statutorily mandated
privilege is necessary for the protection
of society's most precious resource: its
children. The model statute proposed
infra 153 would create a limited childparent privilege which would resolve the
concerns of both the courts and
commentators.
A testimonial privilege vesting in the
child l54 as to confidential communications made by the child to his or her
parents 155 in the reasonable belief that
those communications will be
confidential is an appropriate object of
legislative attention. In establishing the
privilege, it must be recognized that it
derives from a recognition of a child's
need to feel free to seek guidance,
support and counsel from his or her
parents without state-imposed restraint.
It may be assumed that those times when
such a need is felt most acutely by the
child are precisely the times when
children must feel unrestrained to
follow their inclination to confide in
those persons who generally are the
most likely objects of their trust and
affection.
Conversely, while a parent may feel a
similar desire l56 to confide in his or her
child, the very fact of adulthood must be
presumed to impress conscious restraint
and discriminating judgment upon the
parent. An adult, by virtue of age and
more complete knowledge and
experience, is presumed to have the
ability to more completely assess the
consequences of disclosing confidential
information to a child. No such
presumption may fairly be imposed on a
child. It is not the function or the duty of
society in general, nor of the judicial
system in particular, to shield adults
from their own indiscretions. While it is
proper to question whether a child has
knowingly and intelligently waived l57 a
claim to confidentiality by disclosing
Sprill!!,. ]985!Th(' Law FOlum-17

potentially incriminating facts to his or
her parent(s), the same inquiry is
inappropriate when a competent adult
discloses similar information to his or
her child. Put simply: the parent knows
or ought to know better. The critical
inquiry is not whether to create a
privilege which encourages parents to
confide in their children; it is whether to
encourage, unfettered, the natural and
desirable inclination of children to
confide in their parents. In this regard, it
is a proper function of society in general,
and of the judicial system in particular,
to refrain from interference with and the
exploitation of the most basic and
natural impulses of those in our society
who are most vulnerable. Accordingly,
the model statute proposed infra
expressly rejects the broad bilateral
privilege extended in both Fitzgerald and

Agosto.
One commentator has opined that
"the existence of a parent~child privilege
would have no significant impact on the
desirable elements of the relationship. "158
Such a bald assertion cannot reasonably
stand on its own bottom; however, in
light of the foregoing discussion, and
despite the objections of the Fitzgerald
court, age "barriers"159 are appropriate to
the aplication of a child~parent
testimonial privilege. A father need not
be his adult, emancipated child's
"confessor" in order to "full[ y] and
satisfacto[rally]"160 maintain the parent~
child bond. Numerous confidential
relationships are available 161 to the
competent, adult and emancipated
child. 162 The availability of these
relationships provides the would~be
confidential communicant with a myriad
of alternatives to disclosure of potentially
incriminating evidence to a parent.
Because other alternatives are available
to a competent, emancipated, adult child,
confidentiality is not "essential" to the
"maintenance of the relation[ ship ]"163
between a parent and such a child.
Accordingly, the statute proposed infra
limits the application of the privilege to
children who are not yet emancipated and
who are under the age of twenty~two,164
The sole exception to the proposed
limitation would permit the privilege to
extend to an adult child who is found by a
court to be mentally retarded such that
the mental and emotional age of the
child would otherwise qualify the child
to claim the privilege. 165
Under the statute the applicability of
18-The Law Forum! Spring, 1 <;85

the privilege is presumed,l66 except in
circumstances where the child
communicates l67 with his parents in the
presence of third parties who are not also
family, members.168 Although the
presumption arises that the
communication was not intended to be
confidential in the later case,169 both
presumptions are rebuttable by the party
against whom the presumption arises.
The latter presumption is rebuttable by a
preponderance of the evidence tending to
prove that ( 1) the child intended the
communication to be confidential (as in
the case of a conversation overheard by
the third party), 170 or (2) under the
circumstances, the child had a reasonable
expectation that the communication was
confidential notwithstanding the
presence of the third party (as might
occur if a child disclosed confidential
information to a parent in the presence of
a third party who is so familiar or well
known to the child that the child would
have no apprehension as to the extent of
the third party's loyalty ).171
The statute expressly forecloses its
application in certain circumstances,
including cases of child abuse, incest and
abandonment.172 Since it is intended to
be applied for the exclusive protection
and benefit of children, the shield they are
necessarily provided under the statute
must be stripped away in those
circumstances where the privilege would
otherwise stand as a shield for the benefit
of an offending parent. In these
circumstances, the courts are well
equipped to apply every available
resource for the benefit of a child who is
compelled to give testimony under these
exceptions to the privilege.
Provisions are also included which will
prevent the child from asserting the
privilege in those circumstances where a
parent may seek the court's help in
controlling the child's behavior.173 Such
eventualities were foreseen by the A & M
court l74 which recognized that a privilege
which purports to be for the benefit of
children would fail in its essential
purpose were it to do otherwise.
Finally, the privilege would be
unavailable to a child who seeks to invoke
its operation (1) in proceeding "to
establish the mental competency of [the]
proceeding "in which the child and his
parent are opposing parties;" 176( 3 ) where
parent are opposing parties; "176 (3) where
the child is "charged with a crime against
his parent or other legal child of the

parent; " 177 or, (4) when it is found that
the otherwise confidential communica~
tion was made in "furtherance of a crime
or fraud." 178
The model statute proposed infra is
designed to antlclpate those
circumstances in which the privilege is
likely to arise. The principal
consideration in the operation of the
privilege is the reasonable subjective
perceptions of the child. Accordingly,
those perceptions should be judged
according to the perceptions which are
reasonable for a child of the same age,
intelligence and experience l79 acting
under similar circumstances.

V. CONCLUSION
The enactment of a statutory child~
parent testimonial privilege would
eliminate the confusion evident in
present case law. Most importantly, a
limited child~parent testimonial
privilege would vigorously promote
"[a] relation ... which in the opinion of
the community ought to be sedulously
fostered."180
In view of the increased attention
attracted by the issue of the child~parent
privilege, particularly as demonstrated
by recent case law, and considering the
inadequate response of the courts to the
questions presented, the author urges
legislative enactment of a statute
extending a limited child~parent
testimonial privilege. The model statute
proposed infra provides the framework
for such legislation.
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Appendix
Child-Parent Testimonial Privilege
Model Statute
r:P OOI Definitions.
As used in this statute. the following words
and phrases have the meanings ascribed.
(a) "Child": a person who is undertheage
of twenty-two (22) years and who is unemancipated. A person who is found by the
court to be mentally retarded to the extent
that the mental and emotional age of the
person is that of a person under the age of
twenty-two years shall be considered a
"child" for the purposes of this statute
whether or not emancipated and regardless
of actual age.
(b) "Communication": any expression,
interchange or transmission of ideas, expression of thoughts or messages between
two or more persons which is intended for
the purpose of making known from one to
the other the content of such ideas, expression of thoughts or messages. The medium
bv which communications are imparted
shall not be restricted.
(c) "Confidential Communications": any
communication made by a child to his parent and to which a presumption of confidentiality attaches. Except as otherwise
provided in this statute the presence of third
persons shall not alter the confidential nature of the communication.
(d) "Parent": includes the natural or adoptive parent(s), step-parent(s), foster parent(s)
or guardian(s) of the child.
(e) "Proceeding": any juvenile delinquency hearing or proceeding, adult civil
or criminal proceeding, or grand jury proceeding.
(f) "Waiver": the intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right by
the child or his guardian.
(g) Where the masculine gender is used in
this Statute, it shall be taken to include the
feminine gender as appropriate.
§1002 Child-Parent Testimonial Privilege.
Any confidential communication shall be
outside the scope of discovery in any judicial proceeding when the communication
is made(a) by the child to his parent, or by the parent to the child in response to or in communication with confidential communi174
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cations;

(b) within the context of the family relationship; and
(c) for the purpose of obtaining the support, advice or guidance of the parent.
§I003 Person Who May Claim the Privilege.
The child-parent privilege may be c1aimed(a) by a child on behalf of himself and his
parent and as to confidential communications between the child and his parent;

(b) by a guardian appointed by the court
on behalf of any child as defined in this
Statute; or
(c) by an attorney on behalf of the child.
§1004 Waiver of the Privilege.
(a) A child may waive the privilege only
when acting through the effective assistance of legal counsel.
(b) Exception: A person upon whom this
Statute confers a privilege against disclosure waives the privilege if he discloses any
significant part of the privileged matter
following his retaining competent legal
counselor consents to disclosure by his attorney of any significant part of the privileged matter.
§1005 Presence of third persons: Effect on Privilege.
(a) The presence of third persons at the
time of the confidential communication
and who are not members of the child's
immediate family raises a rebuttable presumption that the communication of the
child was not intended to be confidential.
(b) The presumption raised under § 1005
(a) may be rebutted by a preponderance of
the evidence that, under the circumstances
in which the comrnunication occurred, the
child had a reasonable expectation that the
communication was or would remain confidential, notwithstanding the presence of
or inadvertent divulgence to the non-family
member third person.
§I006 Presumption of Confidentiality.
Except as provided in § 1005, a presumption of confidentiality shall attach to any
communication claimed by the child to be
confidential. The opponent of the privilege shall have the burden of establishing
that the communication was not confidential by clear and convincing evidence.
§I007 Exceptions. There shall be no privilege
under this Statu te under the following circumstances (a) When invoked in furtherance of a
crime or fraud: when sufficent evidence has
been introduced in any proceeding which
warrants a finding that the communication
was made, in whole or in part, to further or
facilitate the active involvement of any person in a crime or fraud;
(b) Proceeding to establish competency: in
any proceeding brought by or on behalf of a
party to establish the mental competency of
a child or his parent;
(c) Proceeding in which the child and his
parent are opposing parties: no privilege
shall be recognized in any civil or criminal
proceeding in which the child and his parent are opposing parties.
(d) The child and his parent shall be
deemed to be opposing parties in any proceeding in which the parents are opposing
parties or in which the parent is charged
with:
i. Child abuse;
ii. Incest;
iii. Adultery;
iv. Child neglect; or
v. Abandonment or non-support.
(e) Charge of crime against the parent or
legal child of the parent: any child charged
with a crime against his parent or other
legal child of the parent shall not be entitled
to claim this privilege.
(f) Parent Seeking Assistance of Court:
no child may claim this privilege for the
purpose of preventing his parent from testifying about matters in which the parent
is seeking the assistance of the court in
controlling the child's bahavior.
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